Wednesday, May 27, 2015

Public Policy and the Epistemic Status of Moral Convictions and Religious Beliefs

Introduction


It seems hard imagining a time where debates concerning religious role in shaping public policy come to an end. Quite plausibly there will continue to be debates involving Church and State issues, abortion, cloning, embryonic stem cell research, marriage, religiously informed candidates for public office and so forth regardless of what the current legal climate will look like.

In this blog piece I will examine three issues that are touched on in 2 separate articles. First, I will briefly discuss the common perception concerning the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Epistemic in this context is related to the extent of knowability concerning religious beliefs. Can religious claims be known to be true? If some religious beliefs cannot be directly known or accessed by reason alone, does it mean that all religious beliefs cannot be accessed by reason? Second, I will touch on some of the expectations that are placed on religious advocates when attempting to shape public policy. This will have to do with whether religious and secular arguments (if such an actual distinction really exists) will be evaluated by the same or different standards. And lastly, I will mention a few flaws that some secularists make when referencing religious based policies in conjunction with knowledge/reason and morally contested issues.


The epistemic status of religious beliefs

In his article When religion conflicts with government policies, author and journalist Steve Salerno alleges that any government protections that are extended to Christianity must be extended to other religions as well. This is because “If Christians expect to be free to practice their faith in ways that override civil rights of others and/or flout scientific consensus (e.g. evolution), then they must apply that same privilege to other religions.” (P.1, Para. 5) He also proceeds to delineate religious beliefs from epistemically accessible statements by claiming that democracy is only possible when reason is the guiding force in the process (P. 1, Para. 7). In his words, it is “the legitimacy of opposing views” and “the malleability of laws according to popular will” that democracy depends on, not “hard-line religious dogma”.

In determining whether Christianity has the right to influence policy, Salerno claims that Christianity has no privileged vantage point in this debate over say Mormons, Hindus, or Muslims. If the Christian wants the government to issue protections for him, then he must factor other religious traditions as well. To an extent I can agree with him insofar that all religions in the United States deserve some level of respect even if many or most people reject their beliefs about various topics. But it seems that the fundamental assumption behind Salerno’s remark is the idea that all religions are cut from the same cloth. In other words, Christianity is just as much a religion based on faith as other religions are. There seems to be no deeper element to it than being based on faith. It seems to me that if Salerno believed that Christianity was – in some sense – based on reason or accessible via reason, then maybe he would treat Christianity differently from other religions. But he doesn’t. He treats them all equally and he can only do that if his presupposition – all U.S. based religions are equally irrational or nonrational – is true. But there is little or no argument given in this article that seeks to justify that assertion.


Expectations Religious advocates bear in shaping Public Policy


In his article, Religion-based ideas in public sphere must face scrutiny, writer Muhammad Fadli Mohammed Fawzi mentions three tests that religious advocates must bear in mind when arguing for their views in the public square. First, Fawzi says “religious claims must be transparent and not be hidden behind vague assertions of common good, public interest or family values. Second, religion-based views must be subjected to the same analytical rigour and skepticism we extend to non-religious claims… Third, we should distinguish between making a religiously inspired contribution to public discourse and simply making a religious demand.” (P.1, Para. 3 & 5).

With respect to the first test, it seems that Fawzi is not dismissing claims of the common good, public interest or family values out of hand but rather is speaking to the issue of clarity when those concerns are brought to bear. Hence his comment that religious claims need to be transparent strikes me as indicating they need to have a deep clarity that is visible to other religious and non-religious stripes. Fawzi also seems fair in implicitly thinking that religious arguments could in principle call secular views into question. If this is not what he means, then it seems difficult to understand how standards for evaluating arguments – which are supposedly common to all views – would be equally applied to religious and secular notions of the common good and other things.

And lastly, Fawzi illustrates the difference between a “religiously inspired contribution to public discourse” and “making a religious demand”. First, in a nutshell the former is capable of being visualized and perceived in some measure by various faith and secular traditions and will offer “other public reasons in support of said policies.” (Para. 6). In making a “religious demand” on the other hand, Fawzi alleges that these demands “are generally articulated in a non-negotiable manner and usually seek to confine the scope of freedom for others.” (P. 2, Para. 1). This strikes me as more of a strategic or pragmatic evaluation of religious advocacy rather than an evaluation of its conceptual baggage when compared with secular ideas. It should go without saying that certain secular policies do in fact confine the scope of others’ freedoms. A case in point is Obamacare and the issue of abortion. Obamacare requires certain organizations to provide healthcare options to their employees that include abortifacient pills. This would certainly be viewed as an assault on religious freedom for Catholic run businesses or even hospitals. So I doubt that demands that “seek to confine the scope of freedom for others” are unique to religious advocates.


Secular flaws and morally contested issues


When I was reading Steve Salerno’s article, I could not help but wonder if he ever encountered or read any sophisticated defenders of the epistemically warranted nature of religious beliefs and the pro-life issue. There are four areas where I think Salerno makes elementary and fundamental blunders in his criticisms of evangelicals and Catholics in their oppositions to abortion, teaching of evolution and same-sex marriage.

The first mistake Salerno makes is one of inconsistency. With respect to the issue of evolutionary theory, Salerno seems to be committed to the idea that the only or primary critiques of evolutionary theory are those that come from reading Genesis. He says, “A recent critic of evolution assumed the Bible as an unimpeachable source, as if it were a scientific text.” (P. 2). Salerno makes no mention of certain scientists and other scholars who have criticized Darwinian evolutionary theory (Michael Behe, Stephen Meyer, Philip Johnson, Michael Denton, etc.) without resorting to citing Scripture. Not only that, one would need to ask Salerno if he is willing to see a change of policy on teaching Darwinian evolution in public schools if in fact opposing views to it are granted a fair hearing and end up outnumbering those who support it. Is he going to stick with the democratic process in that issue or will he switch gears?

The second problem has to do with abortion. There are two fundamental flaws in Salerno’s reasoning on how he handles that topic. First, he assumes what he is trying to prove in the abortion controversy. What do I mean by that? Well, Salerno rhetorically asks how “many millions of children are condemned to a brief life without hope because the Church insisted they be born into unspeakable poverty and squalor?” How has Salerno begged the question here? By assuming the unborn fetus is not a child. If the fetus is a child, then we have to take its rights into account and not only children who are already born. But if the fetus is not a child, you don’t need the argument.

Moreover on an unrelated note, Salerno could be accused of dishonest slandering of the Catholic Church’s motives in their opposition to abortion when he claims they “insisted they (the children) be born into unspeakable poverty and squalor.” Can he really in all honesty claim they want children to be born into poverty? I highly doubt it and think it was a deliberate attempt to smudge the reputation and integrity of Catholics. Having that particular agenda puts him as a human being and more specifically as a journalist in a bad light if he’s supposedly all about finding and reporting the truth about important matters in our world.

He also misconstrues and eschews the pro-life position when he says, “If you believe that abortion is wrong, don’t have abortions. But don’t try to deprive your neighbor of her democratically granted dominion over her own body.” (P. 2). Imagine if we were debating the issue of spousal abuse and I said to a woman, “If you believe that spousal abuse is wrong, don’t beat your spouse.” Or “Don’t like rape, then don’t rape anyone.” You would immediately realize that I had confused a preference claim from a moral/normative claim. The pro-lifer is not claiming that he does not like abortions or that he does not think he should have an abortion. He is claiming that abortion is unjust killing of an innocent human being without justification. Therefore, one ought not have an abortion. Salerno is basically assuming there’s nothing fundamentally wrong with abortion because he has begged an important question: Is the human fetus one of us?

Cited Works

·      Religion-based ideas in public sphere must face scrutiny by Muhammad Fadli Mohammed Fawzi
·      When religion conflicts with government policies by Steve Salerno