Introduction
It seems hard imagining a time where
debates concerning religious role in shaping public policy come to an end.
Quite plausibly there will continue to be debates involving Church and State
issues, abortion, cloning, embryonic stem cell research, marriage, religiously
informed candidates for public office and so forth regardless of what the
current legal climate will look like.
In this blog piece I will examine three issues
that are touched on in 2 separate articles. First, I will briefly discuss the
common perception concerning the epistemic status of religious beliefs. Epistemic
in this context is related to the extent of knowability concerning
religious beliefs. Can religious claims be known to be true? If some religious
beliefs cannot be directly known or accessed by reason alone, does it mean that
all religious beliefs cannot be accessed by reason? Second, I will touch
on some of the expectations that are placed on religious advocates when
attempting to shape public policy. This will have to do with whether religious
and secular arguments (if such an actual distinction really exists) will
be evaluated by the same or different standards. And lastly, I will mention a
few flaws that some secularists make when referencing religious based policies
in conjunction with knowledge/reason and morally contested issues.
The
epistemic status of religious beliefs
In his article When religion conflicts
with government policies, author and journalist Steve Salerno alleges that
any government protections that are extended to Christianity must be extended
to other religions as well. This is because “If Christians expect to be free to
practice their faith in ways that override civil rights of others and/or flout
scientific consensus (e.g. evolution), then they must apply that same privilege
to other religions.” (P.1, Para. 5) He also proceeds to delineate religious
beliefs from epistemically accessible statements by claiming that democracy is
only possible when reason is the guiding force in the process (P. 1,
Para. 7). In his words, it is “the legitimacy of opposing views” and “the
malleability of laws according to popular will” that democracy depends on, not
“hard-line religious dogma”.
In determining whether Christianity has
the right to influence policy, Salerno claims that Christianity has no
privileged vantage point in this debate over say Mormons, Hindus, or Muslims.
If the Christian wants the government to issue protections for him, then he
must factor other religious traditions as well. To an extent I can agree with
him insofar that all religions in the United States deserve some level of
respect even if many or most people reject their beliefs about various topics.
But it seems that the fundamental assumption behind Salerno’s remark is the
idea that all religions are cut from the same cloth. In other words,
Christianity is just as much a religion based on faith as other religions are.
There seems to be no deeper element to it than being based on faith. It seems
to me that if Salerno believed that Christianity was – in some sense – based on
reason or accessible via reason, then maybe he would treat Christianity
differently from other religions. But he doesn’t. He treats them all equally
and he can only do that if his presupposition – all U.S. based religions are
equally irrational or nonrational – is true. But there is little or no argument
given in this article that seeks to justify that assertion.
Expectations Religious advocates bear in
shaping Public Policy
In his article, Religion-based ideas
in public sphere must face scrutiny, writer Muhammad Fadli Mohammed Fawzi
mentions three tests that religious advocates must bear in mind when arguing
for their views in the public square. First, Fawzi says “religious claims must
be transparent and not be hidden behind vague assertions of common good, public
interest or family values. Second, religion-based views must be subjected to
the same analytical rigour and skepticism we extend to non-religious claims…
Third, we should distinguish between making a religiously inspired contribution
to public discourse and simply making a religious demand.” (P.1, Para. 3 &
5).
With respect to the first test, it seems
that Fawzi is not dismissing claims of the common good, public interest or
family values out of hand but rather is speaking to the issue of clarity
when those concerns are brought to bear. Hence his comment that religious
claims need to be transparent strikes me as indicating they need to have a deep
clarity that is visible to other religious and non-religious stripes. Fawzi
also seems fair in implicitly thinking that religious arguments could in
principle call secular views into question. If this is not what he means,
then it seems difficult to understand how standards for evaluating arguments –
which are supposedly common to all views – would be equally applied to
religious and secular notions of the common good and other things.
And lastly, Fawzi illustrates the
difference between a “religiously inspired contribution to public discourse”
and “making a religious demand”. First, in a nutshell the former is capable of
being visualized and perceived in some measure by various faith and secular
traditions and will offer “other public reasons in support of said policies.”
(Para. 6). In making a “religious demand” on the other hand, Fawzi alleges that
these demands “are generally articulated in a non-negotiable manner and usually
seek to confine the scope of freedom for others.” (P. 2, Para. 1). This strikes
me as more of a strategic or pragmatic evaluation of religious advocacy rather
than an evaluation of its conceptual baggage when compared with secular ideas.
It should go without saying that certain secular policies do in fact confine
the scope of others’ freedoms. A case in point is Obamacare and the issue of
abortion. Obamacare requires certain organizations to provide healthcare
options to their employees that include abortifacient pills. This would
certainly be viewed as an assault on religious freedom for Catholic run
businesses or even hospitals. So I doubt that demands that “seek to confine the
scope of freedom for others” are unique to religious advocates.
Secular flaws and morally contested
issues
When I was reading Steve Salerno’s
article, I could not help but wonder if he ever encountered or read any
sophisticated defenders of the epistemically warranted nature of religious
beliefs and the pro-life issue. There are four areas where I think Salerno
makes elementary and fundamental blunders in his criticisms of evangelicals and
Catholics in their oppositions to abortion, teaching of evolution and same-sex
marriage.
The first mistake Salerno makes is one of
inconsistency. With respect to the issue of evolutionary theory, Salerno seems
to be committed to the idea that the only or primary critiques of evolutionary
theory are those that come from reading Genesis. He says, “A recent critic of
evolution assumed the Bible as an unimpeachable source, as if it were a
scientific text.” (P. 2). Salerno makes no mention of certain scientists and
other scholars who have criticized Darwinian evolutionary theory (Michael Behe,
Stephen Meyer, Philip Johnson, Michael Denton, etc.) without resorting to
citing Scripture. Not only that, one would need to ask Salerno if he is willing
to see a change of policy on teaching Darwinian evolution in public schools if
in fact opposing views to it are granted a fair hearing and end up outnumbering
those who support it. Is he going to stick with the democratic process in that
issue or will he switch gears?
The second problem has to do with
abortion. There are two fundamental flaws in Salerno’s reasoning on how he
handles that topic. First, he assumes what he is trying to prove in the
abortion controversy. What do I mean by that? Well, Salerno rhetorically asks
how “many millions of children are condemned to a brief life without hope
because the Church insisted they be born into unspeakable poverty and squalor?”
How has Salerno begged the question here? By assuming the unborn fetus is not a
child. If the fetus is a child, then we have to take its rights into account
and not only children who are already born. But if the fetus is not a
child, you don’t need the argument.
Moreover on an unrelated note, Salerno
could be accused of dishonest slandering of the Catholic Church’s motives in
their opposition to abortion when he claims they “insisted they (the children)
be born into unspeakable poverty and squalor.” Can he really in all honesty
claim they want children to be born into poverty? I highly doubt it and think
it was a deliberate attempt to smudge the reputation and integrity of
Catholics. Having that particular agenda puts him as a human being and more
specifically as a journalist in a bad light if he’s supposedly all about
finding and reporting the truth about important matters in our world.
He also misconstrues and eschews the
pro-life position when he says, “If you believe that abortion is wrong, don’t
have abortions. But don’t try to deprive your neighbor of her democratically
granted dominion over her own body.” (P. 2). Imagine if we were debating the
issue of spousal abuse and I said to a woman, “If you believe that spousal
abuse is wrong, don’t beat your spouse.” Or “Don’t like rape, then don’t rape
anyone.” You would immediately realize that I had confused a preference claim
from a moral/normative claim. The pro-lifer is not claiming that he does not
like abortions or that he does not think he should have an abortion. He is
claiming that abortion is unjust killing of an innocent human being without
justification. Therefore, one ought not have an abortion. Salerno is
basically assuming there’s nothing fundamentally wrong with abortion because he
has begged an important question: Is the human fetus one of us?
Cited
Works
·
Religion-based
ideas in public sphere must face scrutiny by Muhammad Fadli Mohammed Fawzi
·
When
religion conflicts with government policies by Steve Salerno
