Is Abortion a Moral Right or Morally Wrong: Nobody can tell me I'm mistaken!

Analogies do not help the abortion debate

One final objection I will address is not a direct objection to the unborn being a person but whether we can even resolve the debate about abortion philosophically. Chris Kaposy, in his article Two Stalemates In The Philosophical Debate About Abortion And Why They Cannot Be Resolved Using Analogical Arguments, argues for three reasons why the abortion debate cannot be resolved. First, he claims that intuitions can be revised. Kaposy observes that since intuitions can be revised frequently in the face of certain analogies, “… There is a huge impetus to revise intuitions that might be at odds with our position on abortion rather than revise our views on abortion themselves, because our views on abortion are often non-negotiable aspects of our cultural or ideological identities. Thus, because of the interference of our ideological commitments, arguments using analogies designed to provoke such revisable intuitions will be largely ineffective in resolving the philosophical debate about abortion.” (P. 7, Para. 2).

I will focus on the first reason for time and space constraints in that intuitions can be revised. Earlier in the essay, Kaposy said that the platform for the debate started at the different principles that each side based their position on. He writes, “Analogical arguments and the analysis of cases are necessary features of the philosophical debate about abortion because, by its nature, the debate is marked by a conflict of principles.” (Kaposy 88). I want to focus on this area because this is really – I think – the foundation that will affect the rest of Kaposy’s argument that the abortion debate cannot be resolved.

Kaposy claims that there are conflicting principles between the pro-lifer and pro-choice based on killing humans vs. respecting autonomous choices and that appealing to analogies to generate principles shared between both parties is problematic because intuitions or principles for both sides can be revised. If asking “What is the issue?” was the underlying factor dividing the pro-life and pro-choice advocate, then the issue would not be conflicting principles but shared moral intuitions in which one side’s reasons for his position on abortion are not consistently applied. If we define the real issue out of question by focusing on certain, howbeit conflicting principles that both sides have, then we cannot get to the real issue but will end up claiming that principles – which are generated via analogies - are inscrutable means of determining which position is right, given the different approaches the pro-life side and pro-choice side take on the abortion issue: autonomous choice vs. unjust killing of human beings. Kaposy might say that applying the reasoning of the pro-choice, (autonomous choice) to a non-abortion example to exploit the real issue dividing the pro-life and pro-choice, is not helpful because the intuitions/principles I appeal to, in order to change his mind of what the real issue, are inscrutable and cannot be used to clarify or progress the debate.

This objection seems to assume two things. First, it seems to assume that both principles are equally plausible or valid for each party. Second, it assumes that both sides are addressing two different issues surrounding abortion. If abortion is not merely about whether it’s right to kill humans but is more about respecting autonomous choices, then using analogies to appeal to intuitions for the abortion choice advocate – who is about respecting autonomous choices - that will persuade him towards the pro life position is unhelpful because he started at a different platform than the pro-life advocate. If he had started at the same platform, then he would be persuaded by the other guy’s arguments via analogy. But since he has a different starting point, he is not obligated to accept intuitions that are meant to dissuade him from his stance because that is his primary concern. The same could apply to the pro-life advocate. Maybe the wrong question or focus has been about changing one’s mind about abortion and should be shifted to changing one’s mind about the real issue. Perhaps the trot out the toddler illustration is not meant to change one’s mind about abortion – even if it does – but is meant to clarify what the real issue is. Clarifying the real issue may not lead one to conclude that abortion is immoral, but it will or should lead one to conclude that the real issue is not autonomous choice but is rather the humanity, personhood, and intrinsic value of the unborn.

There is a second problem towards the end of the article that Kaposy espouses. He seems to claim that we are incapable of knowing whether a particular argument is sound or unsound in matters on abortion when he claims “The problem, however, is that there is no way to assess the soundness of an argument by analogy independently of your interlocutor’s intuitive response to the analogy. If the interlocutor does not have the desired intuitive response (for example to the Hedonist analogy) then there are no grounds for the claim that she ought to accept the conclusion. Furthermore, as I have argued, revising one’s intuitive response is also a legitimate strategy for resisting a conclusion.” (Kaposy 91).

He seems to suggest that arguments via analogy about moral matters – or primarily abortion - cannot be established as sound independently from the other person's intuitive response to the analogical argument. Basically an argument is sound if it corresponds with the other person's desired intuitions. If the argument strikes against her intuitive responses, then she is rationally justified to reject or not accept it. This strikes me as relativism. If I said that my intuitive responses don’t cohere well with the idea of the law of non-contradiction, then I am not obligated to accept it. The same reasoning could be applied to rape, murder, genital mutilation, and other cases where others would claim that are well-established facts.

Kaposy seems to make the notion “compatibility with intuitive responses” the criterion as to whether an argument is sound or unsound. The problem is that he seemed to only apply that to moral or metaphysical cases that include abortion or killing in certain contexts. He also seems to endorse some sort of agnosticism regarding the moral issue of abortion and claims that the default position should be given to the pro-choice position.

There are several problems with this. First, it’s question begging. Granting the right to an abortion presupposes some view of what the fetus is and whether it deserves a right to life. It is not a neutral position. Second, there are counter-examples that reveal the absurdity of this position. First, suppose we said that the default position on the issue of rape should be granted to the rapist since we cannot decide whether rape is morally wrong or not. What would that say regarding our view of the victim? What about slavery? Suppose President Lincoln issued an order in declaring a law granting the right to own slaves while saying he is agnostic about whether slavery is morally permissible. Such a position is contradictory.