Conclusion
In this blog series of posts I argued that the issue,
which divides people who oppose abortion from ones who support it, is based on
a critical question: Who and what are we and can we know it? I argued that
typical reasons given to justify abortion usually detract from the real issue
and focus on irrelevant – howbeit interesting and important – issues. For the
pro-life case, I argued from the science of embryology that the unborn is a
human being from fertilization.
Philosophically, I argued – using the acronym
SLED - that there is no morally relevant difference between the human embryos
we all once were and who we are today as adults that would justify killing us
for any reason without justification. I addressed common objections to the
pro-life position and showed why they are unsuccessful. I argued that Judith
Thomson’s bodily rights and self-defense arguments fail along with Paul
Simmons’ and David Boonin’s arguments to show why the unborn are not persons.
And lastly I tried to show that Chris Kaposy’s argument in undermining the
abortion debate was based on misplaced issues and did not address the real
issue dividing the pro-life and pro-choice sides.
This blog series of posts is by no means an exhaustive
treatment of these issues. There are numerous other sources one could consult.
I hope to have persuaded the person, who defends a woman’s right to an
abortion, to at least reconsider his or her position on the issue, even if they
have not declared themselves pro-life.
Citations
Citations
1. Klusendorf, Scott. The Case for Life. Crossway 2009
2. Condic, Maureen, L. Life: Defining the Beginning by the End.
First Things, May 2003.
3. Bailey, Ronald. Are Stem Cells Babies? Reason, July 11, 2001
4. Saunders, William, L. Embryology: Inconvenient Facts. First
Things. December 2004.
5. Moore, Keith, L. and Persaud, T.V.N. The Developing Human: Clinically Oriented
Embryology 8th edition
(Philadelphia: Saunders/Elsevier, 2008)
6. Kaposy, Chris. Two Stalemates In The Philosophical Debate About Abortion And Why They
Cannot Be Resolved Using Analogical Arguments. Bioethics 26.2 (2012):
84-92. Academic Search Complete. Web. 19 Feb. 2014.
7. Beckwith, Francis. Defending Abortion Philosophically: A Review
of David Boonin’s A Defense of Abortion. Journal of Medicine and
Philosophy, 31:177-203, 2006.
8. Beckwith, Francis. Personal Bodily Rights, Abortion, and Unplugging the Violinist.
International Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXXII, No. 1 Issue No. 125, 1992.
9. Thomson, Jarvis, Judith. A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy and
Public Affairs 1, 1971.
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